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A METHODOLOGY FOR THE RANK ORDERING OF ALT~RNATIVES 
USING A BAYESIAN DECISION MODEL , WITH APPLICATION 
TO THE SPACE PROGRAM 
By 
Dro Ao No Silver 
The Martin Company 
Denver , Colorado 
Swnmary 
The primary objective of this paper is to 
provide a reasonably general and essentially 
unified approach to those problems involving 
"value" judgments and "subjective" decision 
making, without regard to excessive rigor. The 
principle areas and methods of attack developed 
are : 
(1) The selection of a "value" measure 
which emphasizes the fact that the 
criterion of optimum performance 
is quite arbitrary, its merits 
reflecting only the constraints 
on the problem and the objectives 
sought , 
(2) The utilization of statistical 
decision theory as a basis for 
the solution and subsequent 
evaluation of a class of problems 
in which a priori "value " judg-
ments must be assigned by an 
individual or committee under 
uncertainty , and 
(3) The application of the methodology 
to those areas in which the relative 
uncertainty level of a decision need 
be assessed in terms of a cost or 
penalty incurred in reaching the 
conclusion. A parti cularly impor-
tant application is the selection 
of alternatives (ioe., projects by 
corporate executives) and the sub-
sequent sensitivity analysis of 
the decisiono 
Selection of A Value Measure 
Utility in The Classical Sense 
The notion of utility , as defined in the 
classical sense, refers to the capacity of acer-
tain amount of money or goods for satisfying the 
needs of individuals . Other terms used for this 
same concept are "moral gain" (Laplace) 1 and sub-
jective value" . In general , the following law 
holds s 
"Law of Diminishin Mar inal Utili t 11 - If 
a certain gain a certain amount of goods 
or money) is added to an initial fortune f 
0 
then the utility of this gain is the smaller, 
the higher f 
0
• 
This is, of course , an empirical law con-
cerning the reactions of human beings, hence a 
law of psychology; but it is of primary impor-
tance for the application of value theory in 
determining practical decisions. This law was 
first pronounced by Daniel Bernoulli 2 and is 
well known in economics. As an illustration, 
consider the following hypothetical individual 
designated as "X"o 12-27 
The aim of "X" in all his actions is the 
satisfaction of his needs and the avoidance of 
suffering, which we may regard as negative sat-
isfaction. Gains in money or goods are appre-
ciated as means of obtaining satisfactiono Thus, 
what counts is their utility. Therefore, "X's" 
decisions must be guided by the principle of 
maximizing the utility of his gains rather than 
the gains themselves. Since , however , he cannot 
foresee future events , gains, and utilities with 
certainty, but only with probability, he must 
apply the maximizing principle to the estimate 
of utility rather than to the unknown utility 
itself. This, however, presupposes that cer-
tain problems are solved which involve serious 
difficulties. First , utility must be measurable, 
ioe. , quantified , and. further , a law must be 
known defining , as well as determining the 
utility of gains. 
The first problem is to find a . method of 
measuring the (positive or negative) utility of 
a gain (or a loss as a negative gain) for a 
certain person at a certain time . The (positive 
or negative) gain may consist in the acquisition 
(or loss) of money , goods, or other advantageso 
In other words, a quantitative value must be 
found for the otherwise inexact concept of utili-
ty, which is perhaps not quantitative, but merely 
comparative . Thus , the basic problem consists 
in measuring the utility of moneyo If this is 
possible , then it might be possible to measure 
the utility of other goods and advantages (or 
disadvantages) by establishing utility equiva-
lences between them and amounts of moneyo This 
seems possible at least for those goods which can 
be exchanged , bought , and sold. But it might not 
be impossible even for the so-c8lled imponder-
ables; for example , a disease or the recovery 
from it, the positive or negative prestige gained 
by composing a good or a bad symphony , the gaining 
or losing of the love of a woman. However, it 
may be possible, at least "theoretically", to de-
termine the utility of events of this kind for 
"X" by determining his preferential reactions. 
Even if neither "X" nor the medical authorities 
accessible to him know how to cure a certain di-
sease, nevertheless, he can imagine a fairy con-
fronting him with the alternative of either 
curing the disease or giving him a certain amount 
of money. Although the situation is im~ginary, 
"X" can aqk himself what he would prefer, and his 
answer measures his actual valuation. There are 
amounts of money which he will value less than 
the cure, and perhaps others which he will value 
moreo There will also be intermediate amounts 
with respect to which he has no clear preference 
either way , and which will thus represent a money 
equivalent for the utility of the advantage or 
disadvantage in questiono 
It must be admitted that there are some 
serious problems involved in this assumption of 
the possibility of measuring the utility of all 
advantages and disadvantages for a given person 
at a given time on the basis of one common, one-
dimensional scale. But something like this 
assumption is usually ta.ken as a bas i s of an 
analysis of what is called "rational behavior " 
in many parts of social science, especially i n 
economics and ethics, and it is indeed hard to 
see how such an analysis could be made without 
this assumption. For the present purpose , one 
need not enter into a critical exami nation of 
these assumptions. That belongs to t he task of 
the methodology of the fields mentioned. What 
is presupposed here is the more general logical 
assumptions underlying an analysis of ra t i onal 
behavior, expressed in terms of a value measur e . 
Utility in The van Neumann-Morgenstern Sense 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern3 
discuss the problem of a "quantitative" concep t 
of utility and construct an axiomat ic sys tem for 
it. Against those economists who propose t o use 
the concept of utility mere l y in a comparative 
form (e.g., in the method of indiffer enc e curves 
introducted by Pareto), they advance t he follow:ing 
argument. Let us assume that the system of pre-
f erences of the person "X" is complete no t only 
with respect to alternative event s, which when 
chosen, occur with certainty but also with re-
spect to uncertain events with given numerica l 
probabilities. This means that "X" i s able to 
say, f or example, which of the fol l owing two 
a l t ernative events he prefers or whether they are 
equally desirable to hims 1) he r eceives $1. 00 
in cash, or 2) he receives a lottery t i cket which 
represents a chance of obtaining ~ 100.uO with the 
probability 0.01. The authors show that thi s 
complete system of the preferences of "X" de ter-
mines a quantitative concept of uti li ty for "X" 
in all its essential features, leaving open only 
the choice of a zero point and a unit of t he 
utility scale. The resulting numerical uti li ty 
is "that thing for which the calculus of mathe-
matical expectations is legitimate . " 
Many investigations by ec onomi sts concerning 
decisions made by a person "X" (inc luding the 
discussion of utility by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern just mentioned) ar e res tric t ed t o cases in 
which "X" knows the values of probabi li t y for 
certain events, especially for anti cipated con-
sequences of possible actions. The term "proba-
bility" is understood in these investi eations in 
the sense of relative frequency. 
Davidson-Siegel-~uppes Measure of Utility 
Recent efforts during the last decade i n the 
development of a "value " measure have r ec eived 
their principal stimulation from t he t heoretical 
work of von Neumann and t:;orgenstern, co~pled with 
the experimentalism of E. A. Si nger, Jr.4 One of 
the most sophistir.Ated procedures is that de-
veloped by Davidson, Sie.gel, and Suppes5. I n a 
study desit.,ned to measure the uti lity of money 
in the sense of an interval scal e, an event was 
·constructed, which for most pe opl e had a subjec-
tive probability of one-half. The event was pro-
duced by means of dice containing nonsense 
syllables, and was utilized in a gambl i ng si tua-
tion in which subjects were competing for each 
other's "dollar" fortune. 
The essential device that defined opera-
tionally how the individual 's choi ces deter-
mined an ordered metric scaling was a one-person 
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game in which the subject chose between two al-
ternatives , each of which was a probability com-
bination of two outcomes. Obviously, in this 
situation it is assumed that the subject makes a 
choice to maximize his expected utility. Fur-
thermore , both the von Neumann and Davidson pro-
cedures assume that no value is placed '~pon the 
act of gambling itself. However, evidence to 
the contrary has been found by Royden, Suppes, 
6 
and Walsh , who then added this consideration to 
their model. I n trying the "enriched" model on a 
group of sailors and college students, it led to 
better predictions for t he former , but worse for 
the latter. 
Churchman-Ackoff7 Approximate Measure of Value 
In many cases the decision maker is required 
to express a preference between paired sets of 
outcomes , which are not assumed to be mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. For example, consider 
a situation in which an individual desires black 
coffee and sugar. If obtaining coffee a.'nd sugar 
are treated as outcomes, they are not exclusive. 
Furthermore , the Churchma.n- Ackoff approximate 
measure of value is not based on the concept of 
a "standard gamble", and hence makes no assump-
tions concerning "subjective" probability, or the 
maximization of an expected valueo As pointed 
out by these authors the technique resembles a 
procedure developed in chemistry for estimating 
values of a property of each of a set of objects, 
where only comparative evaluations are possible. 
The underlying assumptions are given in a paper 
by Churchman and Ackoff7, and an illustrative 
example presented involving four outcomes. This 
procedure is repeated here for conveniences 
" (l) Have the subject rank the four 
outcomes in order of importance 
and then assign numbers to each 
which reflect his relative evalua-
tion of them. Let 0 , 0 , 0 , and 1 2 3 
o4 represent these outcomes, 
ordered from the most to the least 
important. 
(2) Determine which is preferred, ol, 
or the combina tion of O , 0 , and 
2 3 
o4• If the combination is pre-
ferred, then 
(2a) Determine which is preferred, ol, 
or combination of o2 and o3• 
(3) Determine which is preferred, 02 
or the combination o3 and o4o 
(4) Determine whether or not the 
numbers assigned in step (1) are 
consistent with the preferences 
expressed in steps (2) and (3). 
If they are, the procedure is 
completed; if not, confront the 
subject with the inconsistency 
and have him modify either the 
number of the preferences until 
they are consistent." 
The Expected Value Measure8 
Numerous authors5, 7 have expressed the view 
that the "expected value measure" requires less 
complex judgments than those necessitated by 
either the von Neumann or the Da.v:ids'on proc.edureo 
8 ' . Ackoff points out that this measure of value 
shares with van Neumann 1 s theory, "applicability 
to both quantitative and qualitative outcomes, 
or to a combination of them." The methodology 
for obtaining this measure may be summarized as 
follows8 z 
Given a set of mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive responses, i.e., outcomes R1 , R2 ••• Rn' 
assume that one can obtain from a subject some 
judgments which yield a set of probabilities 
P1 , P2, ••• Pn such that the choices P1 ~l' P2 R2, 
••• Pn Rn are equally preferred. Assume further 
that one maximizes the "expected value". Then 
the result is, 
Pl vl = P2 v2 = ••• Pn vn (l) 
where v1 is the relative value of R1 , and v2 is 
the relative value of R2, ••• etc. 
Let ~ V. = K where K is some arbitrary 
j J 
constant. For simplicity, let K = 1. 
Then from equation (1), it follows that, 
v2 
pl 
vl p2 
v3 = 
pl 
v1 p3 
V. 
PK 
VK J P. J 
where vl ·[ 1 J pl :1- pl 1 + -+ + •••p p2 p3 n 
A Posteriori Probability and The 
Bayesian Model Rationale 
(2) 
The a posteriori approach to the problems of 
decision making under uncertainty, in conjunction 
with the Bayesian Model constitute a means of 
assessing the requisite risks associated with 
subjective "value" judgments by introducing a 
logical structure consisting of: 
(1) the given states of nature, con-
sidered as random, i.e., the a 
priori probabilities, 
(2) the results of an "experiment" 
in order to compute the condi-
tional probabilities of the states 
of nature, i.e., the a posteriori 
probabilities, and 
(3) a loss matrix for determining the 
weighted average of risks corres-
ponding to the minimum Bayes 
strategyo 
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For example, by utilizing the "expected value 
measure" scaled to unity (i a e., K = 1) as a cri-
terion for the rank ordering of alternatives, a 
set of a priori "utility probabilities" may be 
computed, whichecpress the relative numerical 
preferences of the respective alternatives. The 
"experiment" associated with the Bayesian Model 
and the subsequent computation of the conditional 
probabilities is identified with the observer's 
uncertainty in ranking alternative one as one, 
alternative two as two, etc., as well as the un-
certainty in mis-ranking an alternative, ioe., 
alternative one as two, one as three, etc. The 
loss matrix indicates the costs or penalties in-
curred in mis-ranking an alternative, and fur-
nishes the necessary structure for generating the 
weighted average risks corresponding to the mini-
mum Bayes strategy. Several types of loss matri-
ces are considered, i.e., linear, quadratic, and 
cubic. Thus, in ranking alternative one as one 
there is zero loss (all diagonal terms are zero), 
while in the linear case a penalty of one unit is 
incurred in ranking alternative one as two (simi-
larly, alternative two as one, i.e., the loss 
matrix is symmetric), a penalty of two units is 
incurred in ranking one as three, etco For the 
quadratic and cubic cases the losses will be one 
and four, and one and eight units, respectively0 
The analytical expressions which relate the 
a priori and conditional probabilities for com-
puting the minimum Bayes strategy for both the 
continuous and discrete case is given in Appen-
dix I and III, respectively. 
Application to The Space Program and Results 
The Computer Program 
Equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) given in 
Appendix III have been proerammed for the IBM 
1130 computer, with the capability of a 20 by 
20 matrix for f(ZIQ) and R(d;O), the "experiment" 
and "loss" matrices respectivelyo A listing of 
this program is available upon request. In 
addition, the "value" function given by equation 
(2) in the text may be used to compute the vector 
of a priori "utility" probabilities, if this op-
tion is desired. Provision is also made for the 
insertion of an arbitrary set of "utility" proba-
bilities. The program has various input-output 
format options which include a plotting sub-
routine, provisions for stepping the "experiment" 
matrix, as well as intermediate printouts of each 
component of the Bayes strategyo 
A plot of the results of a sample problem is 
presented in Figure 1 for linear, quadratic or 
square law, and cubic loss matrices with pertur-
bations in the a priori probabilities. The 
weighted average or risk corresponding to the 
minimum Bayes strategy is plotted as a function 
of the "pivot" element in the "observer" or 
"experiment" matrix, ioe., f(zlo), with the re-
maining entries for any state of nature Q , 0 , 1 2 
etco, being equally divided. For example, in 
the 3x3 matrix illustrated, the uncertainty in 
ranking alternative one as one with probability 
095 is equal to the uncertainty of ranking alter-
native two as two, and alternative three as three, 
i.e., 095, while the uncertainty associated with 
the ranking of alternative one as two is 005/2 = 
0025, which is equal to the uncertainty in rank-
ing alternative one as three, etc. It should be 
observed that an option also exists in the pro-
gram for inputting an arbitrary "experiment" 
matrix. 
The non-admissible solution boundary region 
in Figure 1 corresponds to the condition where 
each entry in the matrix is the reciprocal of the 
rank of the matrix. Under these circumstances, 
f(ZIQ) is purely random, which constitutes the 
lower bound of the decision-observation space. 
Results Obtained 
The specific problem at hand was to generate 
a set of priorities or rank orderings for a given 
number of candidate experiments to be considered 
for inclusion on a particular space flight in 
accordance with a stated flight profile or objec-
tive, and then assess the alternative decisions 
made in terms of a cost or penalty in the uncer-
tainty level of the respective rankings obtained. 
The approach adopted was to_ form a committee 
in order to achieve "concensus" concerning the 
"value" measure to be used, as well as subseq_uent 
determinations of the rank orderings themselves. 
In accordance with the requirements and rationale 
for a simple, quantitative, and expeditious tech-
nique, the "expected value" measure was adopted 
as the criterion of performance. It should be 
observed that concensus was achieved among the 
fifteen committee members (all engineering line 
personnel) after extensive and exhaustive indi-
vidual assessments. 
Once the criterion standard was selected, 
the process of ranking the candidate experiments 
for a given mission was initiated. The documen-
tation of this procedure is contained in a series 
of Martin Company "daily reports" emanating from 
the committee during the month of February, 1966, 
and indeed, furnishes interesting reading. As a 
by product of the procedure, each member of the 
committee kept a daily log indicating perturba-
tions in his individual preferences from day to 
day. 
Utilizing the results of this committee, the 
priorities were transformed onto a value scale 
(from zero to unity) by equation (2) of the text. 
These computations were then used as the basis 
for the a priori "utility" probabilities of the 
true states of nature, i.e., q(W), in the dis-
crete Bayesian decision model formulation. (See 
Appendix III), 
The "experiment" matrix, f(ZIQ), indicated 
the committee's uncertainty level associated in 
ranking experiment number one as one, experiment 
two as two, etc. Alternatively, the probability 
of misranking an experiment was split equally 
among the remaining candid.ates. 
As before, several loss matrices were pro-
posed, including a linear and square law loss 
matrix. Utilizing the computer pro5Tam developed, 
the weighted average of the risk corresponding 
to the minimum Bayes strategy was computed, and 
plotted as a function of the uncertainty in the 
committee rankings. Some typical results a.re 
shown in Figure 2 for the committee rankings of 
eighteen candidate experiments to be included on 
a given space mission. 
For the square law loss matrix at the 0.50 
uncertainty level a relative risk is shown cor-
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responding to approximately 4.3 units as much as 
the linear case. As the uncertainty increases, 
the effect is exaggerated. However, at the 0.90 
and 0.95 levels of uncertainty this condition is 
considerably less pronounced. 
Appendix II illustrates a portion of the 
computer results obtained. The resultant committee 
concensus, i.e., the input to the ~rogram, is de-
signated by the term "value coefficients", with 
each succeeding experiment ranked relative to the 
first experiment, which is arbitrarily given a 
value of unity. Thus, experiment one is 3.3334 
times as important as experiments two, three and 
four, 606667 times as important as experiment 
five, s.3334 times as important as experiment six, 
etco, until finally experiment one is 500 times as 
important as experiment number eighteen. Based 
on these rankings the a priori probabilities are 
computed using equations (1) and (2) of the text. 
The loss matrix shown is an 18xl8 square law 
matrix, folded at multiples of seven for purposes 
of printout. Some sample computations a.re shown, 
where the "pivot" probability element is in steps 
of O.Olo 
Conclusions 
As experience was gained by the committee in 
performing the rank orderings, and as immediate 
computer feedback became available illustrating 
the sensitivity of the committee rankings as a 
function of the decision uncertainty level for a 
given cost or penalty matrix, there was an in-
herent desire for individuals to utilize the 
computer program developed to compare their own 
rankings (day to day) with that of the committeeo 
This interest enhanced the overall performance of 
the committee, and produced a high level of in-
teraction between committee members. As a result, 
acceptability of the model and the associated 
methodology was improved as the work progressedo 
Several additional potential areas were 
identified as being applicable, in terms of 
evolvint: j_mproved decisions by utilizing the 
concepts developed in the model. At present, 
the methodology is beinG employed to further 
investit:):J.te the dynamics of decision making 
by concensus, as well as to describe a datum 
for the role of middle management in corporate 
level operations. For example, consider the 
project manager who must continually evaluate 
the relative success potential of competing 
projects and assess the risks involved in terms 
of funds and manpower exµenditures. By running 
several alternative rank orderings and various 
loss matrices, the sensitivity of these para-
meters as a function of the decision uncertainty 
level can be explored, and hopefully, further 
insight gained in evolving a better decision. 
The model itself represents a descriptive 
analytical technique to explore alternatives, 
rather than an optimization procedure. In this 
respect it should be observed th&t the useful-
ness and utility of the model is in terms of its 
flexibility for investigatinc.~· perturbations, and 
tnus provide appropriate inputs which serve as a 
basis for value decisions by humans. Ultimately, 
it will be the human who will accept or reject an 
alternative, and responsibility for the conse-
quences rests with him, not the computer. 
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Appendix I 
The Bayesian Decision Model For The 
Continuous Case9 
Let S be an n-dimensional sample space, and 
let w1 and w2 be a partition of the sample space 
such that if a sample point 
s = (z1 , ••• , 2 ), taken froru f(Z,O) n (1) 
falls in w1 action a1 is taken, and if s falls in 
w2 action a 2 is taken. The action probabilities 
are defined as, 
where P(sfw.lo) is the probability that s falls 
1 
in W. (the probability that action a. is taken) 
1 1 
when the true state of nature is G. 
A strategy is defined as the function "d" 
which assigns an action of A to each possible 
sample , where A, in this case is restricted to 
A = {a : a = a1 or a2 } (2) 
The action which is ta.ken is 
(3) 
The "loss" assoc i ated with action "a" and the 
state of nnture G is given by L (a;G). The risk 
(expected loss) correspondine; to strategy "d" is 
given-by: 
R\d;G) = L(a1 ;Q) P(sfw1 1Q) + 
L\a2 ;o) l'(s€"N'2 1o) (5) 
Consider W as a random variable, which has 
a probability distribution, so that 
r(z, w) = p(zlw) q(w) = s(wlz) t(z) (6) 
q(W) is the a priori distribution 
s(wlz) is the a posteriori distribution. 
From equation (5), the risk may be simJJly ex-
pressed as the expected value of the loss. Using 
a compact notation, 
R(d;O) = R(W,d) = Ez { L [ w, d (z)]} (7) 
A strategy "d" is a Bayes strategy corresponding 
to a minimization of the expected risk. 'l.1hus, 
determine "d" such that 
"!_n { Ew [ R(W,a)] } = "!_n J_(R(W, d) q(W) dwl(e) 
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But 
R(W,d) = Ez { L ( W,d(Z)] } = 
1 L [w,d(Z) ] p( ZIW) d.Z • z 
Substituting equation (9) into equation (8) 
m~n { Ew [ R(W,d) ] } 
·(9) 
"!_n {..{ .{1 [ w, d(" )] p(zlw) q(W) dZdW} (10) 
m~n { [ _.(1 [ w ,d(i) ] s(wlz) t(") dZdW} (11) 
= "!_n f It(") [~ 1(W,d(") S(WI Z) dWJ dZ~(l2) 
But t( Z) is a probability distribution which is 
non-negative . Hence, if it is desired to mini-
mize equation (12) over "d", only the function 
in the brackets need be considered. Thus , 
or 
m~n {E.,.. [ R( w. d)]} = "!.nu-1[ W,d(Z ))p(zl W)q(W)dw} 
(14) 
For the particular case, in which the structure 
of the loss function is assumed to be of the 
form , 
L [w,d(z)] = (d - w) 2 
i.e ., quadr~tic or square law loss function , 
equation (14) becomes 
(15) 
m~n { ..( (d-W) 2 p(« lw) q (W) dW} (16) 
Differentiatin,; equation (16) with respect to "d", 
and setting the result equal to zero in order to 
obtain the Bayes strategy yields, 
fw w p(z lw) q('w) dW = t(z) /w w. s(w jz )dw 
( p(Z IW) q( '.V) dW ( r(Z ,W) dW (17) Jw ~ 
but 
Hence , 
r('l..,W) dW = t(Z) 
d = f w S(WIZ) dW = ~ (w lz) 
w 
which i s the well known result obtained by 
Wald10• 
(18) 
Appendix II 
Sample Computer Output 
VALUE COEFFICIENTS 
i.oooo 3e3334 3e3334 le3334 6e6667 8e3334 33e3334 
33e3334 33.3334 33.3334 35.7143 7le4284 166e6667 166e6667 
200.0000 250.00,00 333.3334 500.0000 
A PRIORI PROBABILITIES 
Oe42409 Oel2722 Oel2722 0.12122 Oe0636l Oe05089 0.01212 0.01212 0.01212 0.01212 
0.01187 0.00593 0.00254 0.00254 0.00212 0.00169 0.00121 01oooa4 
LOSS MATRIX 
010000 110000 4.0000 9.0000 16e0000 2s.oooo 36e0000 
49.0000 64.0000 8le0000 100.0000 121.0000 144.0000 169.0000 
19610000 22s.oooo 256e0000 289.0000 
110000 010000 leOOOO 4e0000 910000 16.0000 2s.oooo 
3610000 4910000 64e0000 8110000 100.0000 121.0000 14410000 
169e0000 19610000 22s10000 25610000 
4e0000 110000 010000 110000 4.0000 9.0000 1610000 
2510000 36.0000 4910000 6410000 8110000 100.0000 12110000 
144.0000 16910000 19610000 22510000 
910000 410000 leOOOO 0.0000 110000 410000 910000 
1610000 2510000 3610000 4910000 6410000 8le0000 10010000 
12110000 14410000 169.0000 19610000 
1610000 910000 410000 190000 010000 leOOOO 410000 
9.0000 16.0000 25.0000 36.000Q 4910000 6410000 8110000 
100.0000 12110000 l44e0000 169.0000 
2510000 16.0000 9.0000 4e0000 l.oooo 0.0000 110000 
410000 910000 1610000 2510000 36e0000 49e0000 64e0000 
8le0000 100.0000 121.0000 14410000 
36.0000 2510000 16e0000 910000 410000 110000 010000 
leOOOO 410000 9.0000 16.0000 25.0000 3610000 49.0000 
64.0000 s1.oooo 100.0000 121.0000 
49.0000 3610000 25.0000 16.0000 9.0000 410000 110000 
0.0000 1.0000 410000 9.0000 16e0000 2510000 3610000 
49.0000 6410000 a1.oooo 10010000 
64.0000 49.0000 36e0000 25.0000 16e0000 9.0000 4.0000 
leOOOO 0.0000 leOOOO 410000 9.0000 l6e0000 2s.oooo 
3610000 49.0000 64e0000 8le0000 
8le0000 64.0000 49.0000 36.0000 2510000 16e0000 9.0000 
4e0000 i.oooo 0.0000 leOOOO 410000 910000 1610000 
2510000 36.0000 49e0000 6410000 
10010000 8110000 6410000 49.0000 3610000 25.0000 1610000 
9.0000 4e0000 leOOOO 0.0000 leOOOO 410000 910000 
1610000 25.0000 36e0000 49.0000 
12110000 lOo.oooo a110000 64e0000 4910000 36e0000 2s10000 
1610000 9.0000 4e0000 leOOOO 010000 110000 410000 
9.0000 l6e0000 25e0000 36.0000 
144.0000 121.0000 10010000 8110000 64e0000 4910000 3610000 
25.0000 16.0000 9.0000 410000 110000 0.0000 leOOOO 
4e0000 9.0000 16e0000 2510000 
169.0000 144.0000 l2le0000 10010000 8le0000 64e0000 4910000 
36.0000 25.0000 1610000 9.0000 4e0000 leOOOO 0.0000 
110000 4e0000 9e0000 1610000 
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19610000 16910000 14410000 12110000 10010000 8110000 6410000 
4910000 36.0000 25e0000 l6e0000 9.0000 410000 110000 
010000 1.0000 4e0000 910000 
22510000 19610000 169.0000 144.0000 121.0000 10010000 8110000 
64.0000 49.0000 36.0000 2s.oooo 1610000 910000 410000 
110000 010000 110000 410000 
25610000 22510000 19610000 16910000 144.0000 12110000 10010000 
8110000 6410000 49.0000 3610000 2510000 1610000 910000 
410000 1.0000 0.0000 l.10000 
28910000 25610000 225.0000 19610000 16910000 14410000 12110000 
10010000 e110000 6410000 49.0000 3610000 2s.oooo 1610000 
910000 4e0000 leOOOO 0.0000 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 110000002 
WEJGHTeAV10F RISK CORRESPeTO MIN1BAYES STRAT1 • 0.0000 
PJVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 019900000 
WEIGHT1AV10F RISK CORRESP1TO MIN1BAYES STRAT• • 016453 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 019799999 
WEJGHTeAVeOF RISK CORRESPoTO MIN1BAYES STRAT1 • 111005 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • o.9699997 
WEIGHToAV.OF RISK CORRESP1TO MIN1BAYES STRAT1 • 114477 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 019599996 
WEIGHT1AV10F RISK CORRESPeTO MIN•BAYES STRAT1 • le 7410 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 019499995 
WEl,HT1AVeOF RISK CORRESP1TO MIN1BAYES STRAT1 • 119953 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 019399994 
WEIGHT1AVeOF RISK CORRESP1TO MINeBAYES STRAT• • 212241 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 019299993 
WEIGHT1AV10F RISK CORRESP1TO MINeBAYES STRAT1 • 214262 I 
• I 
PIVOT PROBABILITY ELEMENT • 019199992 
WEIGHTeAV10F RISK CORRESPeTO MINeBAYES STRAT• • 2e6U6 
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!Ppendix III 
Computation of Bayes Strategies 
For The Discrete Case 
Although equations (17) and (18) give the 
Bayes strategies for the continuous case, the 
following tabular formulation is applicable when 
the a priori probabilities, loss function, and 
observations are discrete variables. 
dl 
r(d1 ;o1) 
r(d1 ; o2) 
d2 • • ••.•••• dn 
r(d2 ;o1 ) ••• r(dn;p1) 
B(W,d) B(W, d1 ) •••••••.•..•• B(W,dn) 
w 
wl 
w2 
q(W) == o 
w 
n 
r:Zz11 o)z2 
z 
01 r(z 101 ) ] 
f(ZnlO ) 
r(Z)IO) 02 
g r(z11on) n n n 
The Bayes strategy is the action which minimizes 
where B(W) denotes the minimum value of the 
average expected loss. More explicitly, 
n 
B(W) == ~n IB(W,di)I 
OL iLn 
min 
d I L:w.r(d. ;o)l (2) i=l l l ) 
where 
min\ 1 
"' d /rm ~ W. F(ZIO.) r(d. ;O) l f;-1_ l l l f (3) 
r(z) w1 f(zlo1 ) + w2 r(zlo2) + ••• Wnf(ZIOn) 
(4) 
The weighted average of the risks corresponding 
to the minimum Bayes strategy is simply the pro-
duct of each B(W) multiplied by the corresponding 
f(Z). 
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